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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES HORNSBY,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

v.
(Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Certiorari
to Review Judgment of Court
of Appeals)

CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner

Supreme Court No. 880318

CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON,
and JOHN DOES I through X,
inclusive,
Defendants-Respondents.
QUESTION FOR REVIEW
IN A LAWSUIT IN WHICH ONE PARTY IS A RELIGIOUS
ENTITY, IS IT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL
COURT JUDGE TO REFUSE TO VOIR DIRE PROSPECTIVE
JURORS AS TO CERTAIN MATTERS INVOLVING THEIR
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, SO THAT A LITIGANT MAY
INTELLIGENTLY EXERCISE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES?

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The decision of the Utah

Court

of

Appeals

concerning this

case is reported at 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Ct. App. 1988)

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION
A.

The

decision

to

be

reviewed

was entered on July 26,

1988.
B.

On

September

stipulation and
his brief.

23,

motion for

An order granting

1988,

Respondent

herein

filed

a

an extension of time in which to file
Respondent's motion

was entered on

September 23,

1988, thereby

granting Respondent until October 8,

1988 in which to respond to Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari.
C.

Rule

44(c),

Rules

of

the

Utah

Supreme

Court,

is

inapplicable,
D.

The Utah

Supreme Court

has jurisdiction

to review the

decision in question by a writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3):
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including
jurisdiction
of
interlocutory
appeals, overs
(a) a judgment
Appeals;

of

the

Court

of

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature and Proceedings,

recover damages

This lawsuit

was

for personal injury sustained by plaintiff, James

Hornsby when he laid down his motorcycle so as to
with a

cow that

had escaped

load livestock on a
upon

a

jury

initiated to

truck*

verdict.

avoid colliding

while defendants were attempting to
Judgment for

defendants was entered

Plaintiff appealed, alleging inter alia,

that the questioning of potential jurors during voir dire had been
improperly

limited.

The

Court

of

Appeals

Jackson, JJ.)# reversed and ordered a new trial,
trial

court's

refusal

to

question

membership in a defendant
the plaintiff's
challenges.

religious

ability to

Hornsby v.

Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1988)

holding that the

the jurors concerning their
entity

improperly curtailed

intelligently exercise his peremptory

Corporation of

the Presiding

See appendix A.
2

(Bench, Billings,

Bishop, 87

2.

Statement of Facts.

Presiding Bishop of
Saints

is

a

number of

the

Petitioner

Church

religious

of

Jesus

corporation

LDS properties,

including a

of farmland

adjacent to

cows that had escaped

escaped.
663;

the

of Latter-Day

farm in

Salt Lake County

One Charles Giblett managed

(R. 650, 631; Hornsby, at 23; App. A.)

On March 30, 1983, Giblett and

pastures.

Christ

of

sole which holds title to a

which is part of its welfare program.
the farm.

Corporation

the LDS

from the

In attempting

defendant John

Sutton, owner

farmland, attempted to move two

LDS property

to one

of Sutton's

to relocate the cattle, one of the cows

(R. 629, 630, 650,

673, 662, 691, 598,

658, 660, 662,

Hornsby at 23; app.A.)
Giblett and

Sutton pursued

the runaway cow with the help of

two boys and Sutton's daughter Mary.
down the

area and

Mary

drove her

car up and

then pulled to the roadside to search on foot.

After spotting the runaway cow, she returned to her car.

She saw

Plaintiff Hornsby approaching on his motorcycle and waved her arms
to get

his attention.

(R.

780, 782, 799, 797, 793;
After Hornsby

process.

584, 777, 792,

Mary, he saw the cow come onto the

motorcycle,

Hornsby filed

claims of negligence.

775, 561,

Hornsby at 23; app. A.)

had passed

road and he dropped his

643, 938,

sustaining

injuries

in the

a cause of action, alleging a variety of
(R. 647,

923, 798,

579;

Hornsby at 23;

app. A.)
During the

voir dire

process of

the trial, the court asked

prospective jurors the following question:
3

Are there any of you who feel that you would
have trouble being an impartial juror because
of feelings you may have either pro or con
with regard to the LDS Church that you think
might affect your ability to be a fair and
impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd like
you to raise your hand.
(R. 1023-1025; Hornsbv at 23; app. A.)
The court then stated for the record that all members
panel had

indicated religious

their decision.

jurors

as

Hornsby's

to

their

Church.

located or

whether any

request

religious

residence in the religious unit (stake)
farm was

would have no effect on

(Hornsby at 23; app. A.)

The trial court refused
potential

feelings

of the

to

affiliation,

in which

of them

question the
their

the LDS welfare

held office in the LDS

(R. 325-328; Hornsby at 23-24; app. A.)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE
It is Respondent's position that although
an issue

of great

importance, the

issue was properly dealt with

and resolved by the Utah Court of Appeals.
Appeals recognized
and

committed

prospective
limited

That is, the

Court of

that the trial court had abused its discretion

reversible

jurors

purpose

this case presents

as

of

intelligently exercise

error

to

their

gathering

by

refusing

religious

enough

his peremptory

to

voir

dire

affiliation for the

information
challenges.

in

order to

The Court of

Appeals realized that the peremptory challenge performs a valuable
4

function in the jury system and that its efficacy is vitiated when
a

party

is

not

permitted

to

gather

enough

information from

prospective jurors in order to intelligently exercise that right.
The Court

of Appeals further recognized that the law in this

area is well settled and it
District

Court

for

a

therefore remanded

new

trial.

established in this area, this

is

the case

back to

Because the law is so well

not

a

case

which

should be

entertained by this Court.

POINT II
DURING THE VOIR DIRE PROCESS OF A TRIAL IN
WHICH A RELIGIOUS ENTITY IS A PARTY THERETO, A
LITIGANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO INQUIRE AS TO
THE RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF A PROSPECTIVE
JUROR
FOR
THE
PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENTLY
EXERCISING A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE.
It is a widely accepted

principle

of

law

that

whenever a

religious organization is a party to the litigation, the religious
faith of a prospective juror is a proper
Am. Jur.

2d, Jury,

subject of

inquiry.

47

Section 283. There is a plethora of case law

which supports this basic proposition.
The landmark case of
Baltimore * 143
the

voir

Roman Catholic

Archbishop of

A.2d 627 (Md. 1958) addressed the issue concerning

dire

affiliation.

Casey v.

inquiry

of

a

prospective

juror's

religious

In Casey * the Maryland Court of Appeals set forth as

follows:

5

[T]he law is clear that, if the religious
affiliation
of
a juror might reasonably
prevent him from arriving at a fair and
impartial verdict in a particular case because
of the nature of the case, the parties are
entitled to ferret out, or preferably have the
court discover for them, the existence of bias
or prejudice resulting from such affiliation.
In other words, a party is entitled to a jury
free of all disqualifying bias or prejudice
without exception, and not merely a jury free
of bias or prejudice of a general or abstract
nature....Miles v. United States, 1881, 103
U.S. 304, 26 L.Ed. 481 [jurors asked if they
believed
in
the
truth
of
Mormon
teachings]...We hold that the examination of
the prospective jurors on their voir dire in
this case was not sufficiently comprehensive
to assure the selection
of a
fair and
impartial jury.
Casey, 143 A.2d at 632
It is plaintiff-respondent's position that in accordance with
Casey# Plaintiff's
permitted

to

counsel in

voir

dire

the case

prospective

at bar
jurors

affiliation with the defendant LDS Church.
Casey,

the

parties

are

entitled

as a

concerning

That

their

is, pursuant to

to ferret out or discover the

existence of any and all disqualifying
may have

should have been

bias or

prejudice a juror

result of being affiliated with a religious entity

which is a party to the lawsuit.

It is

this respondent's belief

that the ferreting out of bias or prejudice applies to latent bias
as well as acknowledged bias.
to assume

that although

statement that
juror

may

he is

harbor

a

Accordingly, it

a prospective

capable of

is very reasonable

juror may

being an

make a blanket

impartial juror, that

latent and unacknowledged prejudice or bias

because of his religious

affiliations.

As the

Supreme Court of

Utah stated in State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984):
The most characteristic feature of prejudice
is its inability to recognize itself.
It is
unrealistic to expect that any but the most
sensitive and thoughtful jurors (frequently
those least likely to be biased) will have
the personal insight, candor and openness to
raise their
hands in
court and declare
themselves biased.
Thus,

although

affirmatively when

none

of

asked if

the

trial

court

prospective

they would

fair and impartial and render a
had

the

jurors

answered

find it

difficult to be

judgment against

the LDS Church,

permitted

inquiry

into

the

affiliation of prospective jurors, plaintiff's counsel

religious
would have

had an opportunity to exercise his peremptory challenges in a more
considered manner.
In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed. 759
(1965), the

United States Supreme Court discussed the function of

the peremptory challenge:
The persistence of peremptories and their
extensive use demonstrate the long and widely
held belief that peremptory challenge is a
necessary part of trial by jury. See Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376.
Although
"[t]here is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States which requires the Congress [or
the States] to grant peremptory challenges,"
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586,
nonetheless the challenge is "one of the most
important of
the rights
secured to the
accused,"
Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.
396, 408. The denial or impairment of the
right is reversible error without a showing of
prejudice, Lewis v. United States, supra:
Harrison v. United States, 163 U.S. 140; cf.
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co, v. Shane, 157
U.S. 348.
"For it is, as Blackstone says, an
arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be
exercised with full freedom, or it fails of
its full purpose."
Lewis v. United States,
7

supra, at 378.
The function of the challenge is not only to
eliminate extremes of partiality
on both
sides, but to assure the parties that the
jurors before whom they try the case will
decide on the basis of the evidence placed
before them, and not otherwise.
*

*

*

The essential
nature
of
the peremptory
challenge is that it is one exercised without
a reason stated, without inquiry and without
being
subject
to
the
court's control,
[citations omitted]
While challenges for
cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly
specified, provable and legally cognizable
basis of partiality, the peremptory permits
rejection for a real or imagined partiality
that
is
less
easily
designated
or
demonstrable.
[citations omitted]
It is
often exercised upon the "sudden impressions
and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of
another/' [citations omitted], upon a juror's
"habits
and
associations"
[citations
omitted]...It is no .less frequently exercised
on grounds normally thought irrelevant to
legal proceedings or official action, namely,
the race, religion, nationality, occupation or
affiliations of people summoned for jury duty,
[emphasis added]
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-220.
Accordingly, inasmuch

as a

discernable from appearance, a
religious

grounds

person's religion is not readily

peremptory challenge

necessarily

presupposes

an

exercised on

inquiry into the

same.
In State
permitted to
belief or
juror.

v. Barnett,

445 P.2d

124 (Or.

1968), counsel was

ask a prospective juror whether he had any religious

affiliation that
However,

would prevent

counsel

was

8

not

him from

permitted

being a fair

to follow-up the

juror's answer

by

reversing

trial

the

asking

what

court,

his

the

religious

faith

was*

In

Oregon Supreme Court stated as

follows:
It is true that the prospective jurors stated
that they did not have any religious beliefs
that would prevent them from being impartial
jurors and from giving the defendant a fair
trial. A party does not need to be limited by
that answer,
however; he can pursue the
matter and find out the particular religious
belief of the venireman. A party can make his
own determination whether a venireman with a
particular
belief
will
be impartial or
unprejudiced and
exercise
his peremptory
challenge accordingly.
Barnett, 445 P.2d at 125.
Further, in
Court discussed

State v.

Ball, 685

the utilization

P.2d 1055

of peremptory

(Utah 1984) this
challenges. This

Court stated as follows:
Properly utilized, however, it may be seen
that the peremptory challenge
performs a
valuable function in our jury system. It's
efficacy is necessarily vitiated when a party
is not permitted to gather enough information
from prospective jurors in order to exercise
his right intelligently. In State v. Taylor,
Utah 664 P.2d 439, 447 (1983), we emphasized
that "voir dire examination has as its proper
purposes both the detection of actual bias and
the collection of data to permit informed
exercise of peremptory challenge.
(citations
omitted)
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1059.
Thus, in

accordance with

the Ball

decision, in order for a

peremptory challenge to perform its proper function, a
be permitted
to enable him

party must

to gather enough information from prospective jurors
to

intelligently
9

exercise

that

right.

In the

instant case plaintiff's inquiry was curtailed to a point where he
was

unable

to

gather

enough

intelligently exercise
was reversible

information

his right

error and

to

allow

him

to peremptory challenges.

the Court

of Appeals

to

This

recognized it as

such.
Another.case supportive of plaintiff-respondent's position is
United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d
the

Tenth

provided

Circuit
a

fair

questionnaire

Court
trial

to

be

detailed information
Affleck involved

of

it

submitted

in

therefore,

counsel

would

forty-four

inter

alia,

religious affiliation.

Church.

Returning

a guilty

to

ferret

out

religious

bias

acknowledged or latent - against the accused.

would

page

vindidate the rights of Mormons, and,

needed

instant case, a verdict
defendants

a

the prosecution of a defendant who had defrauded

Affleck

prejudice -

allowed

to prospective jurors asking for

persons affiliated with the Mormon
verdict

Cir. 1985) wherein

Appeals found that the trial court

when

about,

1451 (10th

be

finding
a

liability

on

against

the

finding

the

part

and

In the
of the

Mormon Church and

therefore plaintifffs counsel should have been permitted to ferret
out religious

bias against

was a member of the LDS

the plaintiff.

Church may

very well

That is, a juror who
have perceived the

lawsuit as being a cause brought against "my church."

Counsel for

plaintiff should have been afforded an opportunity to find out any
such latent bias.
See also

Coleman v.

United States,

379 A.2d 951 (D.C. App.

1977) wherein the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated:
10

Inquiry as to a juror's religious beliefs is
proper on voir dire where religious issues are
presented expressly in the case, or where a
religious organization is a party to the
litigation/ or
where it
is a necessary
predicate to the
exercise
of peremptory
challenges.
Coleman, 379 A.2d at 954.
For other

cases consistent with the aforementioned case law,

see the following:
App. 1983);

McGowan v. United States, 485 A.2d

State

v. Miller,

88 P.2d

1191 (D.C.

526 (Id. 1939); Young v.

State, 271 P.426 (Ok. 1928).
Based upon

the case

that the

Utah Court

that the

trial

law cited

of Appeals

court

committed

herein. Respondent maintains

was correct in its determination
reversible

error

by impairing

plaintifffs

right

his

peremptory

challenges.

More specifically, in the case at bar the

Utah Court

to

intelligently

exercise

of Appeals set forth as follows:
Substantial
impairment
of
the right to
informed exercise of peremptory challenges is
reversible error.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219;
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060. In the instant case,
the trial court abused its discretion in
denying voir dire regarding the prospective
jurors1 affiliation with the LDS Church. The
scope of voir dire should be sufficiently
broad to allow the parties intelligently to
exercise their peremptory challenges.
87 UTAH ADV. Rep. 23 (1988) [see decision at appendix A]
POINT III
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN POINT III
OF ITS BRIEF WAS NOT TIMELY RAISED, AND
THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ENTERTAINED BY THIS
COURT.
At

page

13

of

Petitioner's
11

brief,

it

is

argued

that

"Constitutional and
make

religious

improper."

statutory provisions governing jury selection

questioning

for

peremptory

challenge

purposes

Petitioner then refers this Court to Article I Section

4 of the Constitution of Utah, Article VI Section 3

of the United

States Constitution, and Section 78-46-3, Utah Code Annotated.
Inasmuch

as

Petitioner

failed

to raise the aforementioned

provisions in arguing before the Court of Appeals
he is

precluded from

in this matter,

raising arguments based on those provisions

at this time.
POINT IV
DURING THE VOIR DIRE PROCESS OF A TRIAL IN
WHICH A RELIGIOUS ENTITY IS A PARTY THERETO, A
LITIGANT MAY INQUIRE AS TO THE RELIGIOUS
AFFILIATION OF A PROSPECTIVE JUROR WITHOUT
VIOLATING ANY CONSTITUTIONAL AND/OR STATUTORY
PROVISIONS CONCERNING JURY SELECTION.
As

set

forth

the Consitutional
brief

are

not

hereinabove, Respondent herein maintains that
arguments raised

timely

However, even if timely
misplaced

and

may

Petitioner

cites

provisions

as

and

be

number

standing

for

III of Petitioner's

therefore should not be entertained.

raised, the

not
a

in Point

relied
of
the

arguments of
upon

in

Petitioner are

the

constitutional

instant case.
and

proposition that the religious

affiliation of prospective jurors may not be inquired
the

voir

dire

process.

statutory

Specifically,

into during

Petitioner

follows:
These clear and unequivocal statements
both a religious test for service as
and any form
of
discrimination
governmental agency against persons on

prevent
a juror
by any
account

states

as

of religious preference
religious preference.
*

*

or

the

absence of

*

The ruling of the Court of Appeals...requires
courts to use their power in cases in which a
religion is involved to compel jurors to
disclose religious views so that peremptory
challenges can
be used systematically to
discriminate against jurors of a particular
religious persuasion.
In

State

v.

Ball,

685

P.2d

1055

discussed Article I, Section

4 of

the

Petitioner asserts precludes inquiry

same

provisions

which

into a prospective juror's

the Utah

(Utah 1984) this Court
Constitution, one of

religious affiliation.

In

Court set forth the following:
Article 1/ Section 4 of the Utah Constitution
states in pertinent part:
"The rights of
conscience shall
never be infringed...nor
shall any person be incompetent as a...juror
on account of religious belief or the absence
thereof."
We must
decide whether this
provision of the Utah Constitution prohibits
asking a
prospective
juror
whether his
abstention from alcohol is based on "personal
or religious" grounds.
[1] The question of
whether the juror's
abstention was "for a personal conviction or a
religious one" has only a minimal relationship
to
the
constitutional language regarding
incompetence of jurors because of "religious
belief or the absence thereof."
The mere
asking of the question has nothing to do with
competence to serve, that is, with the juror's
basic qualifications to participate
in a
panel.
*

*

*

Religious beliefs, unlike gender or race, are
not readily apparent, and their existence, if
directly related to the subject matter of the
suit (as they may be in a case involving
13

Ball, the

alcohol consumption), must be determined by
preliminary inquiry.
Should those religious
beliefs (or the absence thereof) be the basis
for actual bias, prejudice, or impartiality, a
challenge for cause would likewise lie. In
that event,
an individual
would not be
declared
"incompetent...on
account
of
religious
belief11
in
violation
of the
constitution, but rather unfit to serve in a
particular cause because of actual prejudice.
The fact that actual bias or prejudice is
related in
some way
to an individual's
religious beliefs does not preclude exclusion
for demonstrated inability to serve as an
impartial juror.
To declare otherwise would
be to subordinate the rights of a criminal
defendant to receive a fair trial before an
impartial jury to the persons prejudiced by
their religion (or irreligion) against certain
defendants or behavior.
Such a conflict
between constitutional values is not required
by the language of Art. I, Section 4.

Thus the question of onefs competence for jury
service generally is a separate question from
the issue
of
one's
potential
lack of
impartiality in a particular case. [emphasis
added]

[4] Properly utilized, however, it may be seen
that the
peremptory challenge performs a
valuable function in our jury system.
Its
efficacy is necessarily vitiated when a party
is not permitted to gather enough information
from prospective jurors in order to exercise
his right intelligently. In State v. Taylor,
Utah 664 P.2d 439, 447 (1983), we emphasized
that "voir dire examination has as its proper
purposes both the detection of actual bias and
the collection of data to permit informed
exercise
of
the
peremptory
challenge11
(citations omitted).
We view the question
asked here
by defense
counsel as being
reasonably calculated to discover any latent
bias that may have existed among the four
veniremen who stated that they did not drink;
the information sought, even if it would not
have supported a challenge for cause, would
14

have allowed defense counsel to exercise his
peremptory challenges more intelligently.
Similarly, in the instant case if

peremptory challenge

to dismiss

that juror,

the juror dismissed

be deemed incompetent on account of religious belief in

violation of the constitution;
determination that
in this

permitted to

to a jurorfs religious affiliation, and then utilize a

inquire as

would not

counsel were

the juror

particular cause.

question

of

one's

separate question
impartiality.

rather,

The

That

is, as

merely

to

set forth

be a

in Ballt the

be a juror is a different and

issue

of

onefs

asking

of

the

the

mere

would

harbored a latent prejudice or bias

competence
from

it

religious affiliation has nothing to do

potential
question

lack of

concerning

with competence

to serve

and with a juror's basic qualification to participate in a panel.
Accordingly, inasmuch

as a

litigant is

data to permit an informed exercise
and to

of the

entitled to collect

peremptory challenge,

ferret out any existing latent bias, merely inquiring into

one's religious affiliation does not transgress any constitutional
or statutory provision.
See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct 824, 13 L.Ed
759 (1965) wherein the United States

Supreme Court

set forth the

following:
[Peremptory challenges are often] exercised on
grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal
proceedings
or
official
action, namely,
the...religion...or affiliations
of people
summoned for jury duty.
*

15

•

*

In the quest for an impartial and qualified
jury,
Negro
and
white,
Protestant and
Catholic,
are
alike
subject
to
being
challenged without cause.
Swain, 380 U*S. at 220 and 221
Implicit within this language

Supreme Courtfs belief

is the

that inquiry into a prospective juror's religious affiliation does
not transgress

Constitutional

realizes that

standards.

is, the Court

peremptory challenges may be exercised based upon a

person's religious affiliation.
peremptory

That

challenge

based

It

upon

follows

one's

necessarily entails an inquiry into the

that

exercising a

religious

same*

affiliation

Moreover, if such

an inquiry would be in violation of constitutional provisions, the
Supreme Court

certainly would

have used

different language than

that cited hereinabove.

POINT V
DURING THE VOIR DIRE PROCESS OF A TRIAL IN
WHICH A RELIGIOUS ENTITY IS A PARTY THERETO,
AN INQUIRY
AS TO
A PROSPECTIVE JUROR'S
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION DOES NOT INVADE THE
JUROR'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
Without

citing

Petitioner, at
into a

any

Point IV

authority
of its

in

support of its position,

brief intimates

that an inquiry

prospective juror's religious affiliation would invade the

juror's right to privacy of religious beliefs.
It is this respondent's
one's religious

belief

affiliation is

that

merely

not tantamount

inquiring into

to an invasion of

that person's privacy.
In State v. Ball, in determining

16

that juror

privacy was not

an issue in the case, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
The mere revelation of the general fact that a
religious belief is the basis of a practice,
without a further probing of the nature or
extent of any particular religious belief,
does not result in any injury to the juror.
Any harmless disturbance of a jurorfs privacy
that may occur through the revelation of such
general information is outweighed by its close
relevance to the possibility of bias in the
context of a trial for driving under the
influence of alcohol.
We hold that asking a venireman whether his
abstention from the drinking of alcohol has a
religious basis is not prohibited by the Utah
constitution.
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060.
Similarly, an issue of
facts of
into

this case.

the

Rather,

extent

any

juror's

merely

desired

of the

jurors,

etc. without

harmless

including

to which

LDS Church the member may belong, whether the

probing

into

Further, inasmuch as the LDS Church
any

religious belief.

to inquire as to the general

individual holds any leadership position
Church

exist on the

did not wish to probe

particular

religious affiliation of prospective
local units

does not

Plaintiff-respondent

of

respondent

juror privacy

disturbance

through the revelation

of

of
such

a

or

specific
is a

juror's
general

is

employed

by the

religious beliefs.

party to

this lawsuit,

privacy that may occur
information

is clearly

outweighed by its close relevance to the possibility of bias.

CONCLUSION
One

of

the

basic

objectives
17

of our judicial system is to

ensure litigants

of a

fair trial, free of any bias or prejudice.

To help ensure a fair trial, voir dire
important part

examination has

become an

of a jury trial. Voir dire examination has as its

proper purposes, both the detection of actual bias as well
collection

of

challenges.

The

parties that
on

the

data

to

permit

function

of

informed
the

as the

exercise of peremptory

challenge

is

to

assure the

the jurors before whom they try the case will decide

basis

otherwise.

of

the

evidence

Accordingly, if

its proper function, a
information from

presented

at

trial,

and

not

a peremptory challenge is to perform

party must

be permitted

to gather enough

prospective jurors to enable him to exercise his

challenges intelligently.
The courts have consistently held that a litigant
out information

so as

to detect

any latent bias that may have a

prejudicial effect on the outcome of a case.
the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

may ferret

recognized

In the case

that

the

at bar,

trial

committed reversible error by improperly limiting voir dire.

court
That

is, in a situation such as this wherein the LDS Church is a partydefendant, the religious affiliation of a juror might
from arriving

at a

fair and

impartial verdict.

prevent him

Specifically, a

juror who is a member of the LDS Church may very well perceive the
lawsuit as

a cause of action against "my church".

possible existence of a juror's latent
affiliated

with

a

such

party-defendant,

discover

any

bias

Thus, he

should have

resulting

Because of the

bias resulting
Respondent
from

from being

was entitled to

religious affiliation.

been permitted to inquire in some detail as
18

to the religious affiliation of prospective jurors.
Further,

pursuant

hereinabove, a

to

litigant in

the

overwhelming

authority

cited

a case such as this may inquire as to

the religious affiliation of a prospective juror without violating
any constitutional provisions and without invading a juror's right
to privacy*
Inasmuch as the law
Court of
court,

Appeals has

this

Court

is well

settled in

rectified the
should

deny

this area,

and the

error committed by the trial
Petitioner's

Petition

for

Certiorari.
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BLACK & MOORE

H-

Jajnes R. Black
tines R.

jfrin' M. McDonough
Kevin

X.
Layira/ Boyer
Attorneys for Plaintiff-AppellantRespondent James Hornsby

1 Q

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of the
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari was mailed, postage
fully prepaid, this 7^" day of October, 1988 to the following:
Allen M. Swan
M. Karylynn Hinman
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for DefendantRespondent-Petitioner
Stephen G. Morgan
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Sutton

K\

20

APPENDIX A

CODE• CO
Provo, Utah

87 Utah Advr. Rep. 23

f£

the errant cow back onto Sutton's property.
Cite as
Sutton and Mary drove in separate vehicles
87 Utah Adv. Rep. 23
with emergency lights flashing, trying to locate
the cow. Mary parked and exited her car in a
IN THE
further attempt to locate the cow. When she
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
spotted the cow, she returned to her car.
At that moment, plaintiff James Hornsby,
James HORNSBY,
an employee of Kennecott, was driving home
Plaintiff and Appellant,
on his motorcycle. He noticed Mary waving
•.
her arms at him, but considered her waving to
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
be a greeting, not a warning. Approximately
BISHOP of the Church of Jesus Christ of
200 feet past Mary and her car, the cow
Latter-day Saints, a Utah corporation sole,
darted out onto the road. Unable to avoid the
Charles Giblett, John Sutton, and John Does I cow, Hornsby laid his motorcycle down on the
through X; inclusive,
road and suffered serious injuries.
Defendants and Respondents.
Hornsby filed this action for damages, allBefore Judges Bench, Billings and Jackson.
eging negligence on the part of defendants. In
response to special interrogatories, the jury
found no negligence on the part of any of the
No. 880031-CA
FILED: July 26,1988
defendants but determined plaintiff was negligent and his negligence was the proximate
cause of his injuries. The trial court entered
f HIRD DISTRICT
judgment on the verdict in favor of defendHonorable Timothy R. Hanson
ants.
ATTORNEYS:
On appeal, Hornsby alleges the trial court
Mary A. Rudolph, Laura L. Boyer, James R.
erred in refusing to voir dire members of the
Black.
jury panel concerning their affiliation with the
Stephen G. Morgan for Respondent Sutton.
L.D.S. Church. At the time of voir dire,
Hornsby proposed the following questions,
Allen M. Swan for Respondent LDS Church.
among others, to the trial court:
OPINION
Are any of you members of the
L.D.S. Church?
BENCH, Judge:
Would that, in any way, affect your
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of no
ability to evaluate the evidence in
cause of action entered on a special jury
this case and render a fair decision
verdict. Because the trial court improperly
for the plaintiff?
limited voir dire of the jury panel, we vacate
Did any of you hold a position in
the judgment and remand the case for a new
the L.D.S. Church such as Bishop
trial.
or presiding officer or counselor?
On March 30, 1983, defendants Charles
Which stake was that in? Where is
Giblett, a farmer for defendant Corporation
that located?1
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Would that position affect you in
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (L.D.S.
making a fair decision in this case?
Church), and John Sutton were attempting to
If the evidence were favorable to
load into a horse trailer two cows owned by
the plaintiff in this case, would you
the L.D.S. Church. Approximately one month
have a problem in awarding a judearlier, the two cows had crossed the fences
gment against the L.D.S. Church?
separating Sutton's property and the L.D.S. The trial court rejected Hornsby's proposed
Church's welfare farm located immediately questions, later explaining "it's none of this
northwest of Sutton's property. Sutton and Court's business, or anybody's business what
Giblett had agreed to delay retrieving the cows [jurors'] religious preferences are." The court
to avoid disturbing Sutton's cattle.
then asked:
On March 30, Sutton opened his corral gate
Are there any of you who feel that
and backed his trailer into the opening. He
you would have trouble being an
and Giblett then attached the gate to the
impartial juror because of feelings
trailer with baling wire and a hook. As the
you
may have either pro or con
two men attempted to herd the cows into the
with regard to the L.D.S. Church
trailer, one cow entered the trailer, but the
that you think might affect your
other cow threw its weight against the gate,
ability to be a fair and impartial
dislodging it from the trailer. The cow exited
juror in this case? If so, I'd like
the corral and entered a large field owned by
you to raise your hand.
Kennecott Corporation. For the next hour,
Sutton and Giblett, assisted by Sutton's dau- The court stated for the record that all
ghter Mary and two boys, attempted to direct members of the panel had indicated religious
UTAH ADVANC
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^uug^ VTUUIU nave n© 4eitect on their decir
sion.
Hornsby argues the trial court erred /in
limiting voir dire regarding the jury panel's
religious affiliations. The L.D.S Church* contends where religious doctrine or practices are
not at£ issue, it is norproper for a"court to
inquire as to a juror's "religious affiliation.
The scope of voir dire is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and its
rulings with respect thereto will not be disturbed on appeal absent a demonstrated abuse
of discretion. Maltby vc Cox Constir. Co.,
Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979), cert, denied,
444 U.S. 945 (1979). The trial court abuses its
discretion when, "considering the totality of
the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an
adequate opportunity to gain the information
necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439,448 (Utah 1988).
Voir dire has as one of its purposes the
detection of bias sufficient to challenge a
prospective juror for cause. State v. Taylor,
664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), Under Utah R. Civ.
P. 47(f), a prospective juror may be challenged for cause on any of the folllowing
grounds:
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a
person competent as a juror.
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth degree to either party, or
to an officer of a corporation that
is a party.
(3) Standing in the relation of
debtor and creditor, guardian and
ward, master and servant, employer
and employee, or principal and
agent, to either party, or united in
business with either party, or being
on any bond or obligation for either
party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and creditor shall be
deemed not to exist between a
municipality and a resident thereof
indebted to such municipality by
reason of a tax, license fee, or
service charge for water power,
light or other services rendered to
such resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or
having been a witness, on a previous trial between the same parties
for the same cause of action, or
being then a witness therein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of
the juror in the result of the action,
or in the main question involved in
the actioQ, except his interest as a
member or citizen of a municipal
corporation.
(6) That a state of mind exists on
the part of the juror with reference
to the cause, or to either party,

which will prevent him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to
the substantial right? of the party
challenging; but no person shall be
disqualified as a juror by reason of
having formed or expressed an
opinion upon the matter or cause to,
be submitted to such jury, founded
upon public rumor, statements in
public journals or common notoriety/ if it satisfactorily appears to
the court that the juror can and
will, notwithstanding such opinion,
act impartially and fairly upon the
matter to be submitted to hinu
We believe the question asked by the trial
court was' sufficient to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge for cause
under subsection (6). Because it is not necessary to this appeal, we do not decide whether
the voir dire was sufficient to reveal circumstances or relationships that would warrant
challenges for cause under other subsections of
Rule 47(f).
A second proper purpose for voir dire is
"the collection of data to permit informed
exercise of the peremptory challenge." Taylor,
664 P.2d at 447, Regarding peremptory challenges, the United States Supreme Court has
held:
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one
exercised without a reason slated,
without inquiry and without being
subject to the court's control.
While challenges for cause permit
rejection of jurors on a nanowly
specified, provable and legally
cognizable basis of partiality, the
peremptory permits rejection for a
real or imagined partiality that is
less easily designated or demonstrable.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S 202, 220 (1965)
(citations omitted). A prospective juror's
group affiliations is a common and proper
topic for voir dire and ground for a peremptory challenge. As the Swain Court continued:
[A peremptory challenge] is often
exercised ... upon a juror's "habits
and associations" .... It is no less
frequently exercised on grounds
normally thought irrelevant to legal
proceedings or official action,
namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of
people summoned for jury duty.
Ido (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 6%,
70 (1887)) (emphasis added).
The issue of religion as a topic for voir dire
was addressed in State v Ball, 685 P 2d 1055
(Utah 1984). In Ball, defendaint was charged
with driving under the influence of alcohol.
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l>iifing^voir dire, the trial courf asked the* jury leave., intact ^he "considerable discretion'affopanel^ wKethe^ any of^them^had prejudices rded to trial ^courts fountain voirtdire within*
against"peopler that drink!! None indicated they reasonable limits." See Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060
did. Defendant' then asked "if any of them (trial "court has a duty to * protect juror
chose not to drink for any reason. Four "jurors privacy); People v. Williams, 29 Cal.3d 392,
proposed to^ the .trial court to* ask if those court should not permit inordinately extensive
jurors'choice not to drink was for a personal and unfocused questioning). The judgment in
and the case is
or a religious conviction. The trial court, favor of defendants is vacated
3
remanded
for
a
new
trial.
concerned with constitutional protections,
In light of our decision to remand for a new
denied defendant's request. Defendant was
trial,
it is not necessary to discuss Hornsby's
able to eliminate three of the four non*
drinking jurors by exercising'all of his pere- other alleged errors. However, since the trial
mptory challenges, but the fourth sat on the court may be faced with the same issues W
remand, we make the following observations.
jury which convicted him.
See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held
1986).
defendant's question as to the four jurors'
Hornsby argues defendants' use of the term
reasons for their non-use of alcohol should
"welfare"'
when referring to the farm owned
have been allowed. The Court acknowledged
by
the
L.D.S.
Church improperly biased the
the "extreme deference afforded in Swain to
jury
in
their
favor
and was in violation of a
the unfettered exercise of [peremptory] challcourt
order.
We
fail
to find any met t in
enges/ and stated as follows:
Hornsby's contention. The subject property is
0
Religious beliefs, unlike gender or
commonly referred to as a welfare farm.
race, are not readily apparent, and
Hornsby offers no evidence of improper Mac
their existence, if directly related to
other than mere speculation. Furthermore,
ther subject matter of, the suit ...
Hornsby fails to cite to any record evidence of
must be determined by preliminary
a court order regarding the use of the term
inquiry .... Voir dire is intended to
v "welfare/
\&<?n&& * \s*& tot <m&£& *sA ^ta&
Hornsby also argues the trial court erred in
court to carefully and skillfully
refusing to instruct the jury on res ipsa loqudetermine, by inquiry, whether
itur, negligence per se, and stnet liability. "A
biases and prejudices, latent as well
party is entitled to have the jury instructed on
as acknowledged, will interfere with
his theories of the case and points of law
a fair trial if a particular juror
provided competent evidence is presented to
serves in it.
support them." Steele v. Bremholt, 747 P.2<J
Id. at 1057,1058:
433, 435 (Utah App. 1987). We will reverse a
Both Swain and Ball recognize there ar* trial court's judgment for failure to give a
cases where religion and group" affiliation ar* requested instruction only if the jury is prejappropriate topics for voir dire. In the instant udicially misled or insufficiently or erroneocase, defendant did not propose to question usly advised on the law. Id.
the prospective jurors as to their specific
To warrant a res ipsa loquitur instruction, a
beliefs.2 Rather, as the L.D.S. Church was on* plaintiff must show: 1) the accident was one
of the parties, defendant merely proposed to which ordinarily does not happen but for
question the jurors regarding their affiliation someone's negligence; 2) plaintiffs own use
with the L.D.S. Church. ^Whenever a religiou* or operation of the agency or instrumentality
organization is" a party to the litigation, votf was not primarily responsible for the injury;
dire regarding the jury panel's religious affil" and 3) the agency or instrumentality causing
iations is proper. State%v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108f the injury was within defendant's exclusive
704 P.2d 238 (1985); Coleman v. United control and management. Roylance v. Rowe,
States, 379 A.2d 951 (D.C. 1977); Casey + 737 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah App. 1987). Hornsby
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 2l1 claims the evidence in the instant case establishes the three required elements lor a res ipsa
Substantial impairment of the right to inf' loquitur instruction. However, application of
ormed exercise of peremptory challenges & res ipsa loquitur presupposes a plaintiffs
reversible error. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219; Batfr inability to point to the specific allegedly
685 P.2d at 1060. In the instant case, the tri*1 negligent act which caused the injury. Kusy v.
court abused its discretion in denying voir dir* K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d
regarding the prospective jurors' affiliation 1232 (Utah 1984). If the "evidence in the case
with the L.D.S. Church. The scope of voi* reveals all of the facts and circumstances of
dire should be sufficiently broad to allow thc the occurrence and clearly establishes the
parties intelligently to exercise their peremp" precise allegedly negligent act which is the
tory challenges. In so holding, we do not cause of plaintiffs injury," then res ipsa
require the trial court to propound the precis^ loquitur is not applicable. Roylance, 737 P.2d
questions proposed by Hornsby. Rather, W^ at 235.
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In the instant case, the/evidence presented at
tent with, this ^chapter, and addititrial described and established the'act commonal traffic ordinances which are
itted by^Giblett arid Sutton vwliich7Hofnsby
not in conflict with this chapter.
alleges to be negligentv Defendants backed the The trial 'court's refusal, of Horasby's requehorse trailer into the corral gate opening.! They sted negligence'per se instruction was correct. ,
then attached the rear doors of the trailer to
Finally, Hornsby contends the court erred in
the gate with baling wire. As they attempted refusing to instruct the jury on stria liability.
to load the cows into the trailer, one of the Hornsby claims the cow had a dangerous or
cows threw its weight'against "the gatet dislo- vicious tendency known to\ defendants.
dging it from the trailer. The coW escaped Nothing in the record supports his assertion.
through the opening. As the allegedly negli- The court's refusal to give the instruction was
gent act was clear from the evidence, res ipsa therefore justified.
loquitur was not applicable.
Russell W Bench, Judge
The trial court also refused Hornsby's
requested* instruction on negligence per "se. I CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se. Jorgensen v. Issa, 735LP.2d 80 1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
(Utah App. 1987). Hornsby argues defendants
Norman H. Jackson/Judge
violated Salt Lake County Ordinances,§1010-3 (1966),(now §14:20.050 (1986)), which
1. A stake is a geographical unit in the L.D.S.
states:
Church. In his appellate briefr Hornsby also claims
Every person staking, tethering,
he should have been allowed to ask whether any
juror attended the Oquirrh Stake from where the
herding, grazing or pasturing,' or
cow came, whether any of them held positions in
allowing to run at large or causing
that stake, and whether any of them eveir volunteto be stakeds tethered, herded,
ered
at the subject farm or knew anyone who had or
grazed or pastured, or allowed to
did.
run at large, any horse, cow, mule,
2. The religious beliefs of the prospective jurors are
sheep, goat or swine8 or other
not directly related to the subject matter ol this suit,
animal upon any of the public higand hence could not properly be examined during
hways of the county shall be guilty
voir dire.
of a misdemeanor.
3. Defendants John and Mary Sutton argue any
Defendants' conduct was not in violation of potential prejudice in favor of the L.D.S. Church
section 10-10-3. They were not staking, caused by the trial court's error did not .iffeet the
finding ' as /to their lack of negligence.
tethering, herding;* grazing,' or pasturing the jury's
However, in view of the overlapping nature of the
errant cow under the common definitions of possible liabilities, justice requires a new trial as to
those termso Nor did defendants "allow" the all defendants. See Kord's Ambulance Sen., Inc. v.
cow to run at large. See Santanello v. Cooper, White, 14 Ariz. App, 294;482P.2d903 (1971).
106 "Ariz. 262, 475 P.2d 246 (1970) ("allow*
means to sanction/ permit, acknowledge,
approve of).
In any event, section 10-10-3 must be
Cite as
87 Utah Adv. Rep. 26
construed in light of Utah Code Ann. §41-638(3) (1987), which States:
IN THE
In any civil action brought by tne
UTAH
COURT
OF APPEALS
owner, operator, or occupant of a
motor vehicle ... for damages
Steven V. SUMMERS,
caused by collision with any domPlaintiff and Appellant,
estic animal or animals on a
v.
highway, there is no presumption
Gerald COOK, Warden, State Prison,
that the collision was due to negliDefendant and Respondent.
gence on behalf of the owner or the
Before Judges Orme, Davidson, and Bench.
person in possession of livestock.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-16 (1987) provides:
No. 870070-CA
The provisions of this chapter are
FILED: July 27, 1988
applicable and uniform throughout
this state and in all of its political
THIRD DISTRICT
subdivisions and municipalities. A
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
local authority may not enact or
ATTORNEYS:
enforce any rule or ordinance in
conflict with the provisions of this
James N. Barber for Appellant.a
chapter. Local authorities may,
David L. Wilkinson, Sandra L. Sjogren,
however, adopt ordinances consisStanley H. Olsenfor Respondent.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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Allen M. Swan, A3L65
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES N. HORNSBY,
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT

vs.
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a
Utah corporation sole, CHARLES
GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON AND MARY
LEE SUTTON, and DOES I through
X, Inclusive,

civil N O . -e-e-fs^ro-rsHonorable Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge, commencing
Tuesday the 29th day of October, 1985 and continuing through
Friday the 1st day of November, 1985, Laura L* Boyer appearing
for plaintiff, Allen M. Swan of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
appearing for defendants Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Charles
Giblett and Stephen G. Morgan of Morgan, Scalley & Reading
appearing for defendants John Sutton and Mary Lee Sutton

heard and the matter having been submitted to the jury on
a Special Verdict and the jury having returned its Special
Verdict finding that the plaintiff, James Hornsby, was negligent
and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident
and finding that none of the defendants were negligent, now
therefore it is hereby
ORDERED that judgment enter on the verdict in favor
of each of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause
of action together with defendants1 costs incurred herein
in the sum of 9 *> "

DATED this

»**<*"*«>-...

/</

. .

day of November

ATTEST
H. DIXON HWOLEY
Ciert
By

OeputvClerk

/ D i s t r i c t Judg

Served by mailing copies this

day of November,

1985, to Laura L. Boyer, 3167 West 4700 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84118 and to Stephen G. Morgan, 261 East 300 South,
2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

/3v fiL*. Jl^^Auy^

Allen M. Swan

